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Stability in a Cournot duopoly under asymmetric unionism

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Abstract We analyse the stability issue in a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric unionism and heterogeneous players. We show that labour market institutions matter for the stability of the unique interior Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Interestingly, the role played by the existence of firm-specific unions on stability, when the degree of unionism is asymmetric between the two firms, is at all different depending on whether the (more) unionised firm has bounded rational or naïve expectations. Indeed, a shift in the union’s preference from employment towards wages acts as an economic (de)stabiliser when workers are paid with the (competitive) unionised wage by the bounded rational firm and with the (unionised) competitive wage by the naïve firm.

Keywords Bifurcation; Cournot; Heterogeneous expectations; Monopoly union

JEL Classification C62; D43; J51; L13

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1. Introduction

While a common feature of the standard dynamic oligopoly literature is the assumption of competitive factor markets, in many cases such an assumption does not properly represent real phenomena. For instance, labour markets are often observed to be unionised, especially in Western Europe, and the degree of unionism is higher in concentrated industries. Indeed, a burgeoning literature on unionised oligopoly has recently been developed in a static context (e.g., Horn and Wolinsky, 1988; Dowrick 1989; Bughin, 1995; Naylor 1999; Correa-López and Naylor, 2004; Pal and Saha, 2008; Fanti and Mecherci, 2011). In such models, firms and unions behave incorporate two stages of decisions, which are taken at each stage by anticipating the equilibrium outcome of subsequent stages. However, in a static context the analysis of a possible dynamical role of labour market institutions, and, in particular, the relationship between the degree of unionism and product market stability, is neglected, while being the object of the present study.

The existence of firm-specific monopolistic unions in a dynamic Cournot duopoly is assumed by considering that: (1) wages are unilaterally set by the union, which has the object of maximising a specific objective function. Indeed, unions’ choices take place simultaneously across firms, and each union takes the employment reaction function of its own firm as given. This assumption is intuitive in a dynamic context and differs from the static two-stage game, where each union takes the output market equilibrium employment of its own firm as given; (2) each firm decides on its level of output and optimal factor inputs, given the technology of productions and the wage function determined by the union, and plays a non-cooperative oligopoly game à la Cournot in the output market under bounded rationality (as detailed in Section 2).

As regards the firm’s expectations formation mechanism with respect to the output choice by the rival, some preliminary comments are indeed in order. The assumption of perfect foresight – although widely used also in microeconomics – might be too “heroic” in a strategic rivalry context seems it seems to overestimate the ability of firms to predict the behaviour of prices and quantities (see, e.g., Burmeister, 1980). In any case it would eliminate – by definition – any market adjustment dynamics, leaving, however, the fluctuations of output observed in the real world unexplained as an endogenous feature of the market behaviour\(^1\). By contrast, the assumption of bounded rationality (which implies incomplete information) (i.e., myopic rather than perfect foresight expectations) when, in particular, it generates a more complicated adjustment mechanism than the Cournot-naïve\(^2\) one, see Dixit (1986), allows for the possibility of complex dynamic events.\(^3\) Given bounded rationality,\(^4\) it is important to understand, from an economic point of view, the dynamic effects of fully micro-founded

\(^1\) Therefore such market fluctuations would entirely be due to exogenous random shocks.

\(^2\) Cournot (1838) may be considered as the first economist to introduce naive expectations in a duopoly market.

\(^3\) We recall that, as early shown by Theocharis (1960), when both firms have Cournot-naïve expectations the Nash equilibrium is always stable and, hence, only transitional convergent dynamics are possible in such a case.

\(^4\) As known, the different type of expectations (e.g., heterogeneity) leaves unchanged the equilibrium values of output and profit, but it plays a relevant role in the stability conditions of the Nash equilibrium: it is well established that a high level of the speed of adjustment of the bounded rational firm leads the system to instability via flip or Neimark-Sacker bifurcation of the Nash equilibrium (e.g. Agiza and Elsadany, 2003).
theoretical advances, such as the trade-unions economics, in the light of the increasing interest for a refined analysis in the nonlinear oligopoly literature (see, e.g., Bischi et al., 2010).

Since we are aware that, at the best of our knowledge, no models exist that deal with the effects of trade unions in nonlinear dynamic oligopoly literature, in the present paper we aim to fill this gap by using a duopoly game with quantity competition. For doing this, we have introduced firm-specific union's behaviours in a context of bounded rationality, where each union monopolistically sets the wage, while being either more oriented towards wages or employment, and takes the employment reaction function of its own firm (instead of the equilibrium employment as in the static game) into account, and we address two basic questions: (i) does the structure of labour markets (namely, uniformly unionised versus competitive markets, or, alternatively, a different degree of unionisation between the two firms) matter for stability of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium? (ii) May the interaction between the types of firms’ expectations formation mechanisms and the structure of labour markets, drastically change the role played by unions on stability outcomes?

The main findings of the present paper can be resumed as follows. In the standard Cournot duopoly, when the labour markets become uniformly unionised and the relative importance of wages in the union’s objective increases, the parametric stability region is always enlarged irrespective of whether firms’ expectations are bounded rational or naive. Moreover, we show that when firms’ expectations are heterogeneous and labour market institutions are different (i.e., unionised and competitive), the role played by the relative degree unionism on stability is different depending on the interaction between the types of expectations.

In particular, we show that the process of unionisation of workers (as represented by an increase in the relative importance of wages in the union’s objective) only in the bounded rational firm tends to destabilise the Nash-Cournot equilibrium, while when only those workers employed in the naive firm are unionised, the parametric stability region increases significantly when the intensity of the unionisation (i.e. the importance of wages in the union’s objective) raises.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a dynamic Cournot duopoly with heterogeneous (bounded rational and naive) expectations. Section 3 further develops the model by introducing micro-foundations of trade-unions’ wage choice. Section 4 studies the steady-state and dynamics of the model under asymmetric unionism, and shows the parametric conditions of the existence, local stability and bifurcation of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Section 5 concludes.

2. The Cournot duopoly model with heterogeneous firms

We consider a duopolistic Cournot market for a single homogenous product with inverse demand determined by:

\[ p = a - Q, \]

where \( a > 0 \) is an index that captures the market size, \( p \) denotes the price and \( Q \) is the sum of outputs \( q_1 \) and \( q_2 \) produced by firm 1 and firm 2, respectively.

We assume that firm \( i = \{1, 2\} \) produces goods and services of variety \( i \) through the following production function with constant (marginal) returns to labour: \( q_i = L_i, \)

\( \)

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5 This is shown in an unpublished extended version of the present paper.
where $L_i$ represents the labour force employed by firm $i$. The $i$th firm faces (constant) average and marginal cost $w_i \geq 0$ for every unit of output produced, where $w_i$ is the wage per unit of labour. Therefore, the firm $i$’s cost function is linear and described by:

$$C_i(q_i) = w_i L_i = w_i Q_i. \quad (2)$$

Let $q_{i,t}$ be the firm $i$’s quantity produced at time $t = 0,1,2,...$. Then, $q_{i,t+1}$ is obtained through the following optimisation programmes:

$$q_{1,t+1} = \arg \max_{q_{1,t}} \Pi_{1,t} (q_{1,t}, q^*_{j,t+1}), \quad (3.1)$$

$$q_{2,t+1} = \arg \max_{q_{2,t}} \Pi_{2,t} (q^*_{1,t+1}, q_{2,t}). \quad (3.2)$$

where $q^*_{j,t+1}$ represents the quantity that the rival (i.e., firm $j$) today (time $t$) expects will be produced by firm $i$ in the future (time $t+1$) to maximise profits, $\Pi_{j,t}$.

Following a burgeoning strand of literature (see, e.g., Léonard and Nishimura, 1999; Den Haan, 2001; Agiza et al., 2002; Agiza and Elsadany, 2003; Zhang et al., 2007; Tramontana, 2010), in this paper we assume that firms have heterogeneous (i.e., bounded rational or naive) expectations about the quantity to be produced in the future. Therefore, the bounded rational player 1 uses information on its current profits ($\Pi_{1,t}$) to increase or decrease the quantity produced at time $t + 1$ depending on whether marginal profits (i.e., $\partial \Pi_{1,t}/\partial q_{1,t}$) are either positive or negative. Following Dixit (1986), the adjustment mechanism of quantities over time of the bounded rational player 1 is described by:

$$q_{1,t+1} = q_{1,t} + \alpha q_{1,t} \frac{\partial \Pi_{1,t}}{\partial q_{1,t}}, \quad (4)$$

where $\alpha > 0$ is a coefficient that captures the speed of adjustment of firm 1’s quantity with respect to a marginal change in profit when $q_i$ varies at time $t$. In contrast, we assume that firm 2 has Cournot-naive expectations, so that $q_{2,t+1} = q_{2,t}$. \(^6\)

3. The union’s wage setting

Following the well-established static unionised oligopoly literature mentioned above, we assume that the cost of production of the $i$th firm (i.e., the wage per unit of labour, $w_i$) is no longer exogenous while being the outcome of a strategic decision of its upstream supplier (labour union), as described below.

A decentralised union, distinctly oriented towards wages (employment), unilaterally chooses the wage. As is known, union objectives are not necessarily dominated by wages. In order to derive analytical tractable results for the wage, we assume – following, amongst many others, Pencavel (1984, 1985), Dowrick and Spencer (1994), and Petrakis and Vlassis (2000) –, that the union determines the wage by maximising the following Stone-Geary objective function:

$$V = (w - w^o)^\theta L, \quad (5)$$

\(^6\)As regards the Cournot-naive case, we follow, e.g., Theocharis (1960), and specify in the simplest way the adjustment process, which depends on firms’ expectations formation mechanism: i.e., firm $i$ expects that the rival’s output in period $t + 1$ will be unchanged with respect to the quantity produced in period $t$. 

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where \( w_i \) is the union’s wage, \( w^\circ \) is the reservation or competitive wage, \( L \) is the labour employed by the firm and \( \theta > 0 \). A value of \( \theta = 1 \) gives the rent-maximising case (i.e., the union seeks to maximise the total rent); values of \( \theta \) smaller (higher) than 1 imply that the union is less (more) concerned about wages and more (less) concerned about jobs (see, e.g., Mezzetti and Dinopoulos, 1991; Fanti and Gori, 2011). Moreover, the unions aims to maximise the wage bill when \( w^\circ = 0 \).

Let firm \( i \) have average and marginal cost of production given by \( w_i \), as stated in Section 2. Profits of firm \( i \) can then be written as:

\[
\Pi_i = (p - w_i)q_i. \tag{6}
\]

Using Eq. (1) to substitute out for \( p \) into Eq. (6) and maximising profit with respect to \( q_i \), gives the following firm \( i \)’s best-reply function:

\[
q_i(q_j) = \frac{a - w_i - q_i}{2}. \tag{7}
\]

This is the firm’s output for any given level of wages, which are chosen by the monopolistic decentralised union.

We now turn to the union’s choice. By recalling that \( q_i = L_i \), the firm-specific (decentralised union) \( i \)’s objective Eq. (5) can then be written as follows:

\[
\max_{\{w_i\}} V_i = (w_i - w^\circ)^\theta q_i, \tag{5.1}
\]

subject to Eq. (7), since each firm-specific labour union considers the employment (output) reaction function of its own firm. Therefore, the constrained maximisation of Eq. (5.1) with respect to \( w_i \) gives the following union \( i \)’s wage as a function of the quantity produced by the firm \( i \)’s rival, that is:

\[
w_i(q_j) = \frac{\theta(a - q_j) + w^\circ}{1 + \theta}. \tag{8}
\]

Eq. (8) which defines the best-reply function in wages of union-firm pair \( i \) under the assumption of a non-cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the product market.

Now, substituting out Eq. (8) into Eq. (7) for \( w_i \), we definitely obtain firm \( i \)’s best-reply function as follows:

\[
q_i(q_j) = \frac{a - w^\circ - q_j}{2(1 + \theta)}. \tag{9}
\]

4. Equilibrium and local stability analysis under asymmetric unionism

4.1. Case [BU/NC]

In this section we study the local stability properties of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium when the bounded rational firm 1 pays the non-competitive wage \( w_1 \) determined by the firm-specific union (BU), that is \( \theta > 0 \), and the naive firm 2 pays the competitive or reservation wage \( w^\circ \) (NC), that is \( \theta = 0 \), where \( w_1 > w^\circ \).

To proceed with the analysis further, we build on the two-dimensional system that characterises the dynamics of the BU/NC duopoly game, that is:

\[
\begin{align*}
q_{1,t+1} &= q_{1,t} + \alpha q_{1,t} \frac{\partial \Pi_{1,t}}{\partial q_{1,t}}, \\
q_{2,t+1} &= q_{2,t}
\end{align*} \tag{10}
\]

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where marginal profits are \( \frac{\partial \Pi_{1,t}}{\partial q_{1,t}} = \frac{a - 2(1 + \theta)q_{1,t} - q_{2,t} - w^o}{1 + \theta} \). Therefore, Eq. (10) can alternatively be written as follows:

\[
\begin{cases}
q_{1,t+1} = q_{1,t} + \frac{\alpha q_{1,t}}{1 + \theta} [a - 2(1 + \theta)q_{1,t} - q_{2,t} - w^o] \\
q_{2,t+1} = \frac{a - w^o - q_{1,t}}{2}
\end{cases}
\tag{11}
\]

Equilibrium implies that \( q_{1,t+1} = q_{1,t} = q_1 \) and \( q_{2,t+1} = q_{2,t} = q_2 \). Therefore, the dynamic system defined by (11) can be reduced in equilibrium to:

\[
\begin{cases}
\frac{\alpha q_1}{1 + \theta} [a - 2(1 + \theta)q_1 - q_2 - w^o] = 0 \\
a - w^o - q_1 - q_2 = 0
\end{cases}
\tag{12}
\]

The unique non-negative fixed point \( E_{BU/NC} = (q_1^*, q_2^*) \) of the dynamic system (11) is determined by the following non-negative solution of Eq. (12), that is:

\[
E_{BU/NC} = (q_1^*, q_2^*) = \left( \frac{a - w^o}{3 + 4\theta}, \frac{(1 + 2\theta)(a - w^o)}{3 + 4\theta} \right),
\tag{13}
\]

where \( q_2^* > q_1^* \) since production costs (i.e., wages) faced by the bounded rational firm 1 are higher than those faced by the naïve firm 2.

In order to investigate the local stability properties of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium (13) of the two-dimensional system (11), we build on the Jacobian matrix \( J \) evaluated at the equilibrium point \( E_{BU/NC} \), that is:

\[
J_{BU/NC} = \begin{pmatrix}
J_{11} & J_{12} \\
J_{21} & J_{22}
\end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix}
\frac{3 + 4\theta - 2\alpha(a - w^o)}{3 + 4\theta} & -\alpha(a - w^o) \\
\frac{-1}{2} & 0
\end{pmatrix},
\tag{14}
\]

whose trace and determinant are respectively given by:

\[
T := \text{Tr}(J_{BU/NC}) = J_{11} + J_{22} = \frac{3 + 4\theta - 2\alpha(a - w^o)}{3 + 4\theta},
\tag{15}
\]

\[
D := \text{Det}(J_{BU/NC}) = J_{11}J_{22} - J_{12}J_{21} = -\frac{\alpha(a - w^o)}{2(1 + \theta)(3 + 4\theta)}.
\tag{16}
\]

Therefore, the characteristic polynomial of (14) can be written as follows:

\[
G(\lambda) = \lambda^2 - T\lambda + D,
\tag{17}
\]

with its discriminant being determined by \( Q := T^2 - 4D \).

The local stability properties of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium \( E_{BU/NC} \) are given by the well-known Jury’s condition that follows (see, e.g., Gandolfo, 2010):

\[
\begin{align*}
(i) \quad F & := 1 + T + D = \frac{4(1 + \theta)(3 + 4\theta) - \alpha(5 + 4\theta)(a - w^o)}{2(1 + \theta)(3 + 4\theta)} > 0 \\
(ii) \quad TC & := 1 - T + D = \frac{\alpha(a - w^o)}{2(1 + \theta)} > 0 \\
(iii) \quad H & := 1 - D = \frac{8\theta^2 + 14\theta + 6 + \alpha(a - w^o)}{2(1 + \theta)(3 + 4\theta)} > 0
\end{align*}
\tag{18}
\]
Depending on whether the first (second) [third] condition in (18) is violated, that is \( F = 0 \quad (\text{TC} = 0) \quad \{ H = 0 \} \) together with \( |\gamma J| < 2 \), with the other two being simultaneously fulfilled, the fixed point undergoes: (i) a flip or period-doubling bifurcation (a real eigenvalue that passes through \(-1\)); (ii) a fold or transcritical bifurcation (a real eigenvalue that passes through \(+1\)) when \( TC = 0 \); (iii) a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation (i.e., the modulus of a complex eigenvalue pair that passes through \(1\)). While from (18) it can easily be ascertained that conditions (ii) and (iii) are always fulfilled, condition (i) can be violated.

We now study the analytical conditions under which the numerator of (i) in (18) is equals zero. The following equation \( \text{B}(\theta, \alpha)_{\text{BU/NC}} \) represents a bifurcation curve at which the positive equilibrium \( E_{\text{BU/NC}} \) loseses stability through a period-doubling bifurcation, that is:

\[
\text{B}(\theta, \alpha)_{\text{BU/NC}} := 4(1 + \theta)(3 + 4\theta) - \alpha(5 + 4\theta)(a - w) = 0.
\] (19)

The solutions of Eq. (19) with respect to a parameter of interest, define the flip bifurcation values of such a parameter. Therefore, solving Eq. (19) for \( \alpha \) we get the unique solution of \( \text{B}(\theta, \alpha)_{\text{BU/NC}} = 0 \) with respect to the speed of adjustment as:

\[
\alpha^f(\theta)_{\text{BU/NC}} = \frac{4(1 + \theta)(3 + 4\theta)}{(5 + 4\theta)(a - w)},
\] (20)

which is the flip bifurcation value of \( \alpha \) under BU/NC. Then, from (18)-(20) we have the following propositions.

**Proposition 1.** (1) The Cournot-Nash equilibrium \( E_{\text{BU/NC}} \) of the two-dimensional system (11) is locally asymptotically stable for every \( 0 < \alpha < \alpha^f(\theta)_{\text{BU/NC}} \). (2) If \( \alpha = \alpha^f(\theta)_{\text{BU/NC}} \) a flip or period-doubling bifurcation emerges. (3) The Cournot-Nash equilibrium \( E_{\text{BU/NC}} \) is locally unstable for every \( \alpha > \alpha^f(\theta)_{\text{BU/NC}} \).

**Proof.** Since \( \text{B}(\theta, \alpha)_{\text{BU/NC}} > 0 \) for any \( 0 < \alpha < \alpha^f(\theta)_{\text{BU/NC}} \), then point (1) holds. Since \( \text{B}(\theta, \alpha)_{\text{BU/NC}} = 0 \) if and only if \( \alpha = \alpha^f(\theta)_{\text{BU/NC}} \), then point (2) holds. Since \( \text{B}(\theta, \alpha)_{\text{BU/NC}} < 0 \) for any \( \alpha > \alpha^f(\theta)_{\text{BU/NC}} \), then point (3) holds. **Q.E.D.**

**Proposition 2.** An increase in the relative importance of wages in the union’s objective, \( \theta \), increases the flip bifurcation value \( \alpha^f(\theta)_{\text{BU/NC}} \), and then it acts as an economic stabiliser.

**Proof.** Since \( \frac{\partial \alpha^f(\theta)_{\text{BU/NC}}}{\partial \theta} = \frac{4(16\theta^2 + 40\theta + 23)}{(5 + 4\theta)^2(a - w)} > 0 \), then Proposition 2 follows. **Q.E.D.**

### 4.2. Case BC/NU

In this section we assume that the bounded rational firm 1 pays the reservation wage \( w^\circ \) (BC), that is \( \theta = 0 \), and the naïve firm 2 pays the unionised wage \( w_2 \) determined by the decentralised union (NU), that is \( \theta > 0 \), where \( w_2 > w^\circ \).
Knowing that: (1) Eq. (10) still holds, and (2) marginal profits under BC/NU are 
\[ \frac{\partial \Pi_{\theta \nu}}{\partial q_{i,t}} = a - 2q_{i,t} - q_{2,t} - w^o, \]
the two-dimensional dynamic system can now be written as:

\[
\begin{aligned}
q_{i,t+1} &= q_{i,t} + \alpha q_{i,t}(a - 2q_{i,t} - q_{2,t} - w^o) \\
q_{2,t+1} &= \frac{a - w^o - q_{i,t}}{2(1 + \theta)} 
\end{aligned}
\]

which can alternatively be expressed at the equilibrium point as follows:

\[
\begin{aligned}
\alpha q_{1}(a - 2q_{1} - q_{2} - w^o) &= 0 \\
a - w^o - q_{i} &= 0
\end{aligned}
\]

The unique non-negative fixed point \( E_{BC/NU} = (q^*_1, q^*_2) \) of the dynamic system defined by Eq. (21) is determined by the following non-negative solution of Eq. (22), that is:

\[
E_{BC/NU} = (q^*_1, q^*_2) = \left( \frac{1 + 2\theta(a - w^o)}{3 + 4\theta}, \frac{a - w^o}{3 + 4\theta} \right),
\]

where \( q^*_1 > q^*_2 \) since production costs faced by the bounded rational firms 1 are lower than those faced by the naïve firm 2. It should be noted that the equilibrium output produced by firm 1 under BU/NC is the same as the equilibrium output produced by firms 2 under BC/NU and viceversa.

The Jacobian matrix \( J \) evaluated at \( E_{BC/NU} \) is:

\[
J_{BC/NU} = J_{11} \quad J_{12} \\
J_{21} \quad J_{22} = \begin{pmatrix} 3 + 4\theta - 2\alpha(a - w^o)(1 + 2\theta) & -\alpha(a - w^o)(1 + 2\theta) \\
3 + 4\theta & 3 + 4\theta \end{pmatrix}
\]

whose trace and determinant are respectively given by:

\[
T := Tr(J_{BC/NU}) = J_{11} + J_{22} = \frac{3 + 4\theta - 2\alpha(a - w^o)(1 + 2\theta)}{3 + 4\theta},
\]

\[
D := Det(J_{BC/NU}) = J_{11}J_{22} - J_{12}J_{21} = \frac{-\alpha(a - w^o)(1 + 2\theta)}{2(1 + \theta)(3 + 4\theta)},
\]

which can be used to the following local stability properties of \( E_{BC/NU} \):

\[
\begin{aligned}
(i) \quad F &:= 1 + T + D = \frac{4(1 + \theta)(3 + 4\theta) - \alpha(1 + 2\theta)(5 + 4\theta)(a - w^o)}{2(1 + \theta)(3 + 4\theta)} > 0 \\
(ii) \quad TC &:= 1 - T + D = \frac{\alpha(a - w^o)(1 + 2\theta)}{2(1 + \theta)} > 0 \\
(iii) \quad H &:= 1 - D = \frac{8\theta^2 + 2(7 + \alpha)(a - w^o)\theta + 6 + \alpha(a - w^o)}{2(1 + \theta)(3 + 4\theta)} > 0
\end{aligned}
\]

Similar to the case BU/NC, conditions (ii) and (iii) in (27) are always fulfilled, while condition (i) can be violated.

Defining \( B(\theta, \alpha)_{BC/NU} \) as the bifurcation curve at which the positive equilibrium \( E_{BC/NU} \) looses stability through a period-doubling bifurcation, that is:

\[
B(\theta, \alpha)_{BC/NU} := 4(1 + \theta)(3 + 4\theta) - \alpha(1 + 2\theta)(5 + 4\theta)(a - w^o) = 0,
\]

and knowing that
\[ \alpha^f(\theta)_{BC/NU} = \frac{4(1 + \theta)(3 + 4\theta)}{(1 + 2\theta)(5 + 4\theta)(a - w^\theta)} = \frac{\alpha^f_{BU/NC}}{1 + 2\theta}, \]  

(29)
defines the flip bifurcation value of \( \alpha \) under BC/NU, then from (27)-(29) we have the
following propositions.

**Proposition 3.** (1) The Cournot-Nash equilibrium \( E_{BC/NU} \) of the two-dimensional system (11) is locally asymptotically stable for every \( 0 < \alpha < \alpha^f(\theta)_{BC/NU} \). (2) If \( \alpha = \alpha^f(\theta)_{BC/NU} \) a flip or period-doubling bifurcation emerges. (3) The Cournot-Nash equilibrium \( E_{BC/NU} \) is locally unstable for every \( \alpha > \alpha^f(\theta)_{BC/NU} \).

**Proof.** Since \( B(\theta, \alpha)_{BC/NU} > 0 \) for any \( 0 < \alpha < \alpha^f(\theta)_{BC/NU} \), then point (1) holds. Since \( B(\theta, \alpha)_{BC/NU} = 0 \) when \( \alpha = \alpha^f(\theta)_{BC/NU} \), then point (2) holds. Since \( B(\theta, \alpha)_{BC/NU} < 0 \) for any \( \alpha > \alpha^f(\theta)_{BC/NU} \), then point (3) holds. Q.E.D.

**Proposition 4.** An increase in the relative importance of wages in the union’s objective, \( \theta \), reduces the flip bifurcation value \( \alpha^f(\theta)_{BC/NU} \), and then it acts as an economic stabiliser.

**Proof.** Since 
\[ \frac{\partial \alpha^f(\theta)_{BC/NU}}{\partial \theta} = \frac{-4(7 + 8\theta)}{(1 + 2\theta)^2(5 + 4\theta)^2(a - w^\theta)} < 0, \]  

then Proposition 4 follows. Q.E.D.

From Propositions 2 and 4 we may conclude that the process of unionisation of only one firm\(^7\) may stabilise or de-stabilise the market equilibrium depending on whether the unionised firm has naïve or bounded rational expectations. This shed some light on the complicated dynamic events unions can contribute to explain and the importance of the type of firms’ expectations under unionism.

Furthermore, a comparison of the duopoly games BU/NC and BC/NU gives the following corollary.

**Corollary 1.** (1) With asymmetric unionism, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium under BU/NC is more likely to be destabilised than under BC/NU for any \( \theta > 0 \). (2) Moreover, the stabilising effect of \( \theta \) under BU/NC is stronger than de-stabilising effect of \( \theta \) under BC/NU.

**Proof.** Since \( \alpha^f(0)_{BU/NC} = \alpha^f(0)_{BC/NU} \) and \( \alpha^f(\theta)_{BU/NC} > \alpha^f(\theta)_{BC/NU} \) for any \( \theta > 0 \) and since Propositions 2 and 4 hold, then Point (1) holds. Since (i) \( \alpha^f(\theta)_{BU/NC} \) is a monotonic

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\(^7\) This result of course also holds when the degree of unionisation of workers in one firm is higher than in the other firm. By passing, we note this result is robust to the existence of a technology with decreasing returns to scale (i.e. quadratic wage costs) (the proof is here omitted here for economy of space and is available upon request).
increasing function of $\theta$ and $\lim_{\theta \to +\infty} \alpha^F (\theta)_{BU/NC} = +\infty$, and (ii) $\alpha^F (\theta)_{BC/NU}$ is a monotonic decreasing function of $\theta$ and $\lim_{\theta \to +\infty} \alpha^F (\theta)_{BC/NU} = \frac{2}{d - w_o}$. Q.E.D.

![Figure 1](image_url)

**Figure 1.** Stability-instability regions in $(\alpha, \theta)$ plane.

Figure 1 clearly shows that when $\theta$ increases, the parametric stability region (i.e., the regions below both curves $\alpha^F (\theta)_{BU/NC}$ and $\alpha^F (\theta)_{BC/NU}$) under BU/NC increases more rapidly than the extent of decrease in it under BC/NU.

The results above highlight the importance of the interaction between the types of expectations of each firm and the existence (or intensity) of unionisation at the fir level. Now, it is natural to inquire about the economic reasons why the asymmetry between firms – as regards expectations on the one hand, and unionisation of workers on the other hand – may lead to an opposite role on stability of the importance of wages in the union’s objective when only one of the two firms is unionised.

(1) Let us begin with the economic intuition behind the stabilising effect of unionisation when the unionised firm has bounded rational expectations. Indeed, in the case of heterogeneous players what actually matters for stability is the “reaction” to the perceived profits of the bounded rational player: in a nutshell, if for the outstanding market situation (i.e., for the given parameter set) the market equilibrium is stable (unstable), then an increase (decrease) in the intensity of such a reaction of marginal profits properly acts as a de-stabiliser (stabiliser). Therefore, the existence of unionisation in the bounded rational firm reduces the perceived marginal costs (because wages increase) and, thus, for any given level of the other parameters of interest and speed of adjustment, the output supplied in the future (time $t+1$) will be lower than the output supplied in the case of competitive labour market.

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*For the sake of precision, we note that the change in unionisation also changes the reaction function of the naive firm, and thus a feedback effect also exists in the perceived marginal profit of the rival (bounded rational) firm: such a feedback effect is of opposite sign than the direct effect. However, it can easily be shown that the direct effect always dominates, so that it is the direct effect of the unionisation (i.e., higher wages) on the perceived marginal profit that determines the stabilising role of unions.
The reduced marginal profits and the lower response of the bounded rational firm due to the existence of union, explain the stabilising role played by unionisation of workers in such a firm.

(2) We now go through the economic reasons behind the destabilising effect of unionisation when the unionised firm has naïve expectations. In this case, unionisation increases the wage costs in such a firm and then reduces, ceteris paribus, the output supplied. This in turn causes a positive feedback effect on the perceived marginal profits of the rival, i.e. the bounded rational firm, which negatively depend on the output supply of the naïve firm. Therefore, through this channel, the response of the bounded rational firm is to increase output in equilibrium.

Definitely, through an indirect linkage, only unionisation of workers in the naïve firm tends to stabilise the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.

5. Conclusions

We analysed the dynamics of a Cournot duopoly where (1) firms are different in the extent of the decision mechanism they adopt in a context of bounded rationality, and (2) firm-specific unions set the wage, while acting asymmetrically between the two firms. Following the recent static unionised oligopoly literature, we assumed that each union unilaterally chooses the wage, according to an objective function that embodies both wages and employment as arguments, while taking the employment reaction function (instead of the equilibrium employment, as in the static case), of its own firm into account.

The main result of the present study concerns the role played by the degree of unionism on stability of the unique positive Cournot-Nash equilibrium: in contrast with the case in which both labour markets become uniformly unionised – where the uniform degree of unionisation always acts as an economic stabiliser – we show that when the firms’ expectations formation mechanisms are heterogeneous and labour markets institutions are different (i.e., workers in one firm are unionised while being paid according to the rules of competition in the other firm), the stability effects of the degree of unionism are different depending on the interaction between the types of firms’ expectations and the existence (absence) of unionism.

In particular, we showed that the higher the degree of unionisation (i.e., the higher the relative importance of wages in the union’s objective) of workers within the bounded rational firm, the smaller the parametric stability region of Cournot-Nash equilibrium.9 This is because, once the speed of adjustment is fixed at a fairly low value such that the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is locally stable, the extent of the firm’s output response only depends on the size of the perceived marginal profit. If marginal profits are reduced by unionisation, which in turn increases wages, then the firm’s output response is low and then unionisation acts as an economic stabiliser. Conversely, if marginal profits of the bounded rational firm are increased by unionisation of workers employed in the naïve firm, then unionisation works as an economic de-stabiliser.

This present analysis has been by no means exhaustive as regards the role played by unions in a nonlinear dynamic Cournot duopoly, and researchers have several further challenges to be solved for: for instance, the analysis of a duopoly game with

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9 Conversely, when unionisation emerges only in the naïve firm the region of stability increases with the degree of unionisation.
price or quantity competition under horizontal product differentiation where firms are
homogeneous as regards the type of expectations formation mechanisms but the
degree of unionism of workers within each firm is different can be the object of future
research.

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